Introduction

The Israeli West Bank Barrier (also called the "West Bank Security Fence" by its supporters, or "West Bank Wall" by its opponents) is a physical barrier consisting of a network of fences, walls, and trenches, which is being constructed by Israel.

The constructed and approved extents of the barrier approximately follows the 1949 Jordanian-Israeli armistice line, also known as the "Green Line". In some areas the route diverges from this line, particularly in areas with a high concentration of Jewish settlements: East Jerusalem, Ariel, Beitar Illit, Efrat, Gush Etzion, Emmanuel Karmel Shomron, Givat Ze'ev, Oranit and Maale Adumim. These divergences may be as much as 20 kilometers. On February 18, 2005 the Israeli cabinet approved a new route for the barrier which would leave approximately seven percent of the West Bank and 10,000 Palestinians on the Israeli side.

The name of the barrier is itself a political issue. The most common names used by Israel are "separation fence" (gader ha'hafrada in Hebrew) and "security fence" or "anti-terrorist fence" in English, with "seam zone" referring to the land surrounding the fence. Palestinians and other opponents of the barrier prefer to call it a "wall," sometimes referring to it as an "apartheid wall". The United Nations and the international community use inconsistent wording, including separation/security and fence/wall/barrier.

A similar barrier, the Israeli Gaza Strip barrier, runs parallel to the 1949 armistice line.

History and Purpose

Since its inception, Israel has erected physical barriers as a means of protection against fedayeen and guerilla attacks.

The idea of creating a physical barrier between the Israeli and Palestinian populations was first proposed by Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, following the murder of an Israeli teenager girl in Jerusalem. Rabin said that Israel must "take Gaza out of Tel Aviv," in order to minimize friction between the peoples. Following an outbreak of violent incidents in Gaza in October of 1994, Rabin announced his stance that "we have to decide on separation as a philosophy. There has to be a clear border. Without demarcating the lines, whoever wants to swallow 1.8 million Arabs will just bring greater support for Hamas."

To this end, the government of Yitzhak Rabin built the Israeli Gaza Strip barrier in 1994. Following an attack on Bet Lid, near the city of Netanya, Rabin made his goals more specific:

This path must lead to a separation, though not according to the borders prior to 1967. We want to reach a separation between us and them. We do not want a majority of the Jewish residents of the state of Israel, 98 % of whom live within the borders of sovereign Israel, including a united Jerusalem, to be subject to terrorism.

In early 1995, the Shahal commission was established by Yitzhak Rabin to discuss how to implement a barrier separating Israelis and Palestinians. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, prior to the Camp David 2000 Summit with Yasser Arafat, vowed to build a separation barrier, stating that it is "essential to the Palestinian nation in order to foster its national identity and independence without being dependent on the State of Israel".

Although at the beginning the Israeli government of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon was hesitant to construct the barrier, it finally embraced the plan. The stated purpose of the barrier is to prevent terrorists from entering Israeli cities, a problem which has plagued Israel since the start of the Second Intifada. A secondary purpose of the barrier is to prevent illegal infiltrations by Palestinians, mainly illegal immigrants and car thieves. The Israeli Government says that the high concrete portions are to protect cars and people on the Israeli side from gunfire. Many Israelis note the danger of terrorist incursions from the area, such as waves of suicide bombings in early 2002. (See Passover massacre). Palestinians and many other opponents of the barrier suspect that the security explanation is only an excuse for a geographical containment of the Palestinians in order to pave the way for an expansion of Israeli sovereignty.

Although the Israeli government has consistently asserted that the purpose of the security barrier is to prevent attacks against Israeli targets, and that any hardship is an unfortunate side effect, necessitated by terrorist attacks, the barrier's opponents claim that the existence and the purpose of the barrier is to create hardship for Palestinians and prejudge any future borders.

Structure and Timeline

Most of the barrier consists of a wire fence with an exclusion area on each side, often including an anti-vehicle trench. The total width of the barrier will average 60 meters, though in certain cases the barrier will reach a width of one hundred meters due to topographic conditions. Some sections, under five percent of the total length, consist of a concrete wall up to 8m (25 ft.) high, such as near Qalqiliya and Jerusalem. In all cases there are regular observation posts, automated sensing devices and other apparatus. There are gates at various places which are controlled by Israeli soldiers when they are not closed. The total length as officially authorized by the end of 2003 will be 650 km (403 miles).

As of November 2003, the barrier extends inside most of the north-western and western edges of the West Bank, sometimes close to the Green Line, and sometimes running further east. In some places there are also secondary barriers, creating a number of completely enclosed enclaves. It is not known whether a decision has been made to build a barrier on the eastern side of the main regions of Palestinian Arab population. Depending mostly on this decision, somewhere between 6 and 45 % of the West Bank will eventually be outside the barrier.

In October 2003, the region between the barrier and the Green Line was declared a special military area. Although all Israelis and all Jews regardless of nationality can enter the region freely, Palestinians can enter only with special permits even if they are residents of one of the dozen or so Arab villages in the region. Many who tried to obtain permits were refused them.

In February 2004, Israel said it would review the route of the barrier in response to U.S. and Palestinian concerns. In particular, Israeli cabinet members said modifications would be made to reduce the number of checkpoints Palestinians had to cross, and especially to reduce Palestinian hardship in areas such as Qalqilya where the barrier goes very near, and in some cases nearly encircles, populated areas.

On June 30, 2004, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that a portion of the barrier near Jerusalem violates the rights of Palestinians, and ordered 30 km of existing and planned barrier to be rerouted. However, it did rule that the barrier is legal in essence and accepted Israel's claim that it is a security measure. On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opinion that it is a violation of international law. At the beginning of September 2004, Israel started the southern part of the barrier.

Effects on Palestinians

The barrier generally runs along the Green Line, but dips into the West Bank to include some Jewish settlements. Because of the complex path it follows, most of the barrier is actually set in the West Bank, while only 20% is actually on the Green Line. Parts of the barrier are built on land confiscated from Palestinians.

Qalqilya, once known as the West Bank's "fruit basket", lies within a tight loop of walled portions of the barrier (conceived as a "sniper wall" to prevent gun attacks against Israeli motorists on the nearby Trans-Israel Highway) and is cut off on three sides from the farms that supply its markets and the region's second-largest water source. Access into and out off the 40,000-inhabitant town passes through a single Israeli checkpoint.

In early October 2003, the OC Central Command declared the area between the separation barrier in the northern section of the West Bank (Stage 1) and the Green Line a closed military area for an indefinite period of time. New directives stated that every Palestinian over the age of twelve living in the enclaves created in the closed area have to obtain a “permanent resident permit” from the Civil Administration to enable them to continue to live in their homes. Other residents of the West Bank have to obtain special permits to enter the area.

A report issued by the UN Office for the Co-Ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (before the February 2005 modifications to the barrier route) states that the barrier will separate almost 700,000 Palestinians from their farms, jobs, and schools. Israel rejects the report which it says is inaccurate. The report claims that the barrier will carve off 14.5% of the West Bank. Israel disputes this claim and asserts that only 4% of the West Bank will be carved off, leaving 14,000 Palestinians west of the barrier.

As of May 2004, the fence construction has already uprooted an estimated 102,320 Palestinian olive and citrus trees, demolished 75 acres (304,000 m²) of greenhouses and 23 miles (37 km) of irrigation pipes . It now rests on 15,000 dunums of confiscated land, only meters away from a number of small villages, or hamlets. To date some 218 buildings have been demolished in the village of Nazlat 'Isa, the majority of which have been stores, an important source of income and survival for a number of communities; 5 homes have also been demolished for the Wall. [15] The United Nations has established a register to register claims of property damage caused by the seperation barrier. Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, siad, "...we are establishing that register to be able in time to help those with claims." The Israeli Government has promised that trees affected by the construction will be replanted.

According to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), 15 communities will be directly affected, numbering approximately 138,593 Palestinians, including 13,450 refugee families, or 67,250 individuals.

In June, 2004, the Washington Times reported that the reduced need for Israeli military incursions in Jenin have prompted efforts to rebuild damaged streets and buildings and a gradual return to a semblance of normalcy.

In a letter dated 25 October 2004, from the Israeli mission to Kofi Annan, Israel's government points out that a number of restrictions east of the barrier have been lifted as a result of the barrier, including a reduction in checkpoints from 71 to 47 and roadblocks from 197 to 111.

International Law and Human Rights

In October 2003, the United States vetoed a United Nations Security Council resolution, which stated:

The construction by Israel, the occupying power, of a wall in the Occupied Territories departing from the armistice line of 1949 is illegal under relevant provisions of international law and must be ceased and reversed.

The United Kingdom, Germany, Bulgaria and Cameroon abstained from the vote. The justification given by the US for the veto was that the resolution did not condemn terrorist attacks made by Palestinian groups. The United States, however, has been widely condemned around the world for its support of the barrier.

One week later, on October 21, a similar (though non-binding) resolution (ES-10/13) was passed by the UN General Assembly 144-4 with 12 abstentions. The resolution said the barrier was "in contradiction to international law," and demanded that Israel "stop and reverse" its construction. Israel called the resolution a "farce".

The proponents of the barrier claim that its route is not set in stone, as it was challenged in court and changed several times. They note that the cease-fire line of 1949 was negotiated "without prejudice to future territorial settlements or boundary lines" (Art. VI.9). Security experts argue that the topography does not permit putting the barrier along the Green Line in some places, because hills or tall buildings on the Palestinian side would make the barrier ineffective against terrorism. The ICJ has countered that in such cases it is only legal to compensate by delving into Israeli territory, not Palestinian.

International Court of Justice Ruling

In December 2003, the General Assembly passed a resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to make an advisory (non-binding) ruling on the "legal consequences arising" from the construction of the barrier. The hearings began in February 2004. The Palestinian Authority is not a member of the court but was allowed to make a submission by virtue of being a UN observer and a co-sponsor of the General Assembly resolution. In January 2004, the court also authorized the League of Arab States and the Organization of the Islamic Conference to make submissions.

Israel initially announced that it would cooperate with the court, while noting that advisory rulings of the ICJ are not binding. Israel later made a written submission to the court rejecting the authority of the court to rule on the case, but announced (on February 12, 2004) that it would not appear at the court to make oral submissions. Twenty countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and France, submitted a written opinion to the Court stating that the problem should be solved by political rather than judicial means. By the deadline for written submissions, 44 member states of the United Nations had made submissions in addition to the Palestinian Authority and the two organizations mentioned above.

On January 30, 2004, Israel announced officially it did not recognize ICJ authority to rule over the barrier issue. Israel also dispatched a 120 page document, elaborating on the security needs to build the "terror prevention fence" and purporting to demonstrate the atrocities committed by Palestinian terrorists. The document also included a judicial part with legal accounts supporting Israel's claim that the issue of the barrier is political and not in the ICJ authority.

On 23, 24 and 25 February 2004 the hearings before the International Court of Justice took place in the Peace Palace at the Hague.

The decision

On July 9, 2004, the International Court of Justice issued its opinion against the barrier, calling for it to be removed and the Arab residents to be compensated for any damage done. The Court advised that the United Nations General Assembly, which had asked for the ruling, and the Security Council should act on the issue.

The ICJ opinions were as follows:

1. The construction of the wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, and its associated regime, are contrary to international law;
   
   
   
2. Israel is under an obligation to terminate its breaches of international law; it is under an obligation to cease forthwith the works of construction of the wall being built in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, to dismantle forthwith the structure therein situated, and to repeal or render ineffective forthwith all legislative and regulatory acts relating thereto, in accordance with paragraph 151 of this Opinion;
   
   
   
3. Israel is under an obligation to make reparation for all damage caused by the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem;
   
   
   
4. All States are under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by such construction; all States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 have in addition the obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention;
   
   
   
5. The United Nations, and especially the General Assembly and the Security Council, should consider what further action is required to bring to an end the illegal situation resulting from the construction of the wall and the associated regime, taking due account of the present Advisory Opinion.

The opinion were passed 14-1 by the court judges, except for the 4th decision which was passed 13-2.

Thomas Buergenthal was the sole dissenting member of the 15 judges on this ICJ panel. In his declaration he concluded that the court should have declined to hear the case since it did not have before it "relevant facts bearing directly on issues of Israel's legitimate right of self-defense."

Reaction

Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat said, "This is an excellent decision. This is a victory for the Palestinian people and for all the free peoples of the world."

Israel rejected the ICJ ruling and emphasized the barrier's self-defense aspect, and stressed that Israel will continue to build the barrier. The USA also rejected the ruling, declaring that the issue was of political rather than legal nature. Colin Powell stated that barrier was effective against terror, and noted that the ICJ ruling was not binding, but insisted that Israel not use the barrier to predetermine permanent borders.

Numerous human rights organizations welcomed the ICJ ruling. Amnesty International said that Israel should immediately cease constructing the barrier. The governments of Israel's neighbors Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt also welcomed the ruling.

On July 20, 2004, the United Nations General Assembly passed a (non-binding) resolution demanding that Israel obey the ICJ ruling. Israel, the USA, Australia, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau voted against the resolution, 10 nations abstained, and 150 nations voted in favor.